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response to points raised in petitioner's reply brief. I have
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1. North Fork Preservation Ass'n. v. Dept. of State
Lands, 778 P.2d 862 (Mont. 1989). Respondents' brief at pages
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2. Deer Valley Unified School District v. Superior
Ct., 157 Ariz. 537, 760 P.2d 537 (1988) Respondents' brief at
pages 24 through 50; petitioner's reply brief at pages 16-30.
3. Van Wagoner v. Whitmorey 58 Utah 418, 199 P. 670
(1921). Respondents' brief at pages 40 through 44; petitioner's
brief at pages 44-45, and petitioner's reply brief at pages 1620, and 26-29.
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to show that FmHA was entitled to the
writ?
[5] Bretz argues that the following defects were present in the motion for an
order of writ of assistance: the affidavit in
support of the FmHA motion showed the
wrong dates for the sheriffs sale and the
certificate of sale; no judgment was properly obtained; there was no proper notice
of redemption, no proper publication of notice of sale, and no actual notice of sale;
the redemption time was exceeded according to the dates given on the notice; and
the sheriffs deed was issued too early.
Many of the defects claimed under this
issue are discussed under the other issues
in this appeal. It is true that the dates
given in the affidavit as the dates of the
sheriffs sale and the certificate of sale
were incorrect We admonish respondent's
counsel, who executed the affidavit in support of the motion for the writ, to exercise
caution in insuring the accuracy of his filings.
For a writ of assistance to properly issue, there must be a judgment, a sale conducted according to the judgment, and a
sheriffs deed to the property. Federal
Land Bank of Spokane v. Heidema (1986),
224 Mont 64, 727 P.2d 1336, 43 StRep.
2020. The record shows that those elements were present here and met the statutory requirements. We hold that the District Court did not err in issuing the Writ
of Assistance.
Affirmed.
HARRISON, SHEEHY, HUNT and
GULBRANDSON, JJ., concur.
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NORTH FORK PRESERVATION
ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
•.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE LANDS, a
Department of the State of Montana,
Defendant and Appellant,
and
Farmers Union Central Exchange
(Cenex), Intervenor and
Appellant
No. 88-516.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted June 15, 1989.
Decided Aug. 22, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Sept 14, 1989.

Environmental preservation association brought action challenging Department of State Lands' approval of oil and
gas lessee's operating plan, which called
for drilling of exploratory well on leased
tract of school trust land within state forest, alleging Department failed to prepare
environmental impact statement on proposed well, and lessee intervened. The
District Court, Eleventh Judicial District,
Flathead County, Michael Keedy, J., entered summary judgment in favor of association and issued writ of mandate directing Department to prepare environmental
impact statement Department and lessee
appealed. The Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that (1) proper standard of
review was whether Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully; (2)
Department, in approving plan without requiring environmental impact statement,
did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully; and (3) mandamus was not available remedy.
Reversed, writ of mandate dissolved,
case remanded.
Hunt, J., dissented and filed opinion.
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1. Woods and Forests *»8
Standard of review applicable to Department of State Lands' approval of oil
and gas lessee's operating plan, which
called for drilling exploratory well on
leased tract of school trust land within
state forest, was whether Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully,
rather than whether Department's decision
was clearly erroneous. MCA 2-4-704, 751-101 et seq., 77-1-202.
2. Health and Environment «=J25.10(2)
Department of State Lands acted lawfully in approving oil and gas lessee's operating plan, which called for drilling of exploratory well on leased tract of school
trust land within state forest, without requiring environmental impact statement;
Department followed required procedures,
included in its preliminary environmental
report information required by statute and
administrative rules, and made its decision
to forego environmental impact statement
at point in process where that decision was
still up to Department's discretion. MCA
75-1-101 et seq., 75-1-201, 75^1-202.
3. Health and Environment *=>25.10(2)
Department of State Lands did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding to
approve oil and gas lessee's operating plan,
which called for drilling of exploratory well
on leased tract of school trust lands within
state forest, without requiring environmental impact statement; in process of preparing preliminary environmental reports,
there were many concerns expressed and
much information provided, in response to
which Department adopted mitigation measures in form of 42 protective stipulations,
warranting conclusion that Department
had considered concerns raised and taken
significant steps to address them. MCA
75-1-101 et seq.
4. Mandamus *=»85
Mandamus was not available to compel
Department of State Lands to take discretionary action of preparing environmental
impact statement prior to approving oil and
gas lessee's operating plan, which called
for drilling of exploratory well on leased

tract of school trust land within state forest
Tommy H. Butler argued, Dept. of State
Lands, Helena, Doug James argued, Moulton, Belligham, Longo & Mather, Billings,
Dana L. Christensen, Murphy, Robinson,
Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, for appellants.
Jon L. Heberling argued, McGarvey, Heberling, Sullivan & McGarvey, Andrew
Bittker argued, Kalispell, for plaintiff and
respondent.
McDONOUGH, Justice.
This appeal involves an oil and gas lease
on school trust land within the Coal Creek
State Forest, which was acquired from the
State by the Farmers Union Central Exchange (Cenex). School trust lands are
administered by the Department of State
Lands (Department), which issued the lease
to Cenex. Pursuant to an Annual Operating Plan approved by the Department, Cenex proposes to drill an exploratory well on
its leased tract. North Fork Preservation
Association (North Fork) has challenged
the Department's approval of Cenex's operating plan, alleging that the Department
failed to prepare an environmental impact
statement on the proposed well as required
by law. North Fork filed its complaint in
the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial
District, Flathead County, and obtained a
summary judgment in its favor. The judgment set aside the Department's approval
of Cenex's operating plan; issued a writ of
mandate directing the Department to prepare an environmental impact statement;
and awarded costs, fees and a small money
judgment. We reverse, and remand the
case to the District Court for entry of
judgment in favor of the Department. We
hold that the District Court incorrectly applied the "clearly erroneous" standard for
reviewing the Department's decision and
misinterpreted applicable statutory and
case law. We further hold that the Department's decision was proper under the correct, "arbitrary, capricious or unlawful"
standard of review, and that mandamus
was not a proper remedy in this case, as
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mandamus is not available to compel a discretionary act
The parties have stated a number of issues, some of which overlap:
As Stated by the Department
1. Whether the Department must prepare an environmental impact statement on
the drilling of a single exploratory well on
school trust land which had been previously
clear-cut of timber and is managed under
the multiple use concept
2. Whether the Department is required
to prepare a site-specific environmental impact statement concerning full-field oil and
gas development
3. Whether mandamus is an inappropriate remedy to enforce the provisions of the
Montana Environmental Policy Act ,
4. Whether North Fork Preservation
Association sustained its burden of proof.
As Stated by Cenex:
1. Did the District Court apply the
wrong standard of review in reviewing the
State Lands' decision that approval of Cenex's plan to drill one exploratory well was
not a major action of state government
significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment?
2. Whether State Lands1 decision that
an environmental impact statement was not
required was arbitrary and capricious.
3. Whether the 1984 preliminary environmental review was sufficient, as a matter of law, without considering the "cumulative impacts" of oil and gas development
and production.
4. Whether a writ of mandamus will lie
to compel the preparation of an environmental impact statement
As Stated by North Fork:
1. Did the District Court apply the
wrong standard of review to State Lands'
procedural decision to forego an environmental impact statement?
2. Whether the Cenex operating plan
"may significantly affect environmental attributes recognized as being endangered,

fragile, or in severely short supply." ARM
26.2.603(3Xa).
3. Piecemealing: At what stage in the
oil and gas lease process is an environmental impact statement on development legally required?
4. Is there a separate ground supporting the District Court's decision, which
State Lands and Cenex did not raise on
appeal?
5. Whether the 1984 preliminary environmental review was legally sufficient,
particularly in its evaluation of cumulative
impacts.
6. Whether a writ of mandate Vill lie to
compel preparation of an environmental impact statement
In April of 1975, the Department received applications for oil and gas leases on
14 tracts of school trust land in the Coal
Creek State Forest The Department deferred action on possible leases until an
environmental impact statement (EIS)
could be prepared Coal Creek State Forest is bordered on three sides by National
Forest Service land, and on the fourth side
by the North Fork of the Flathead River.
The river is part of the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers System, as well as the western boundary of Glacier National Park.
The surrounding National Forest Service
land was also the subject of oil and gas
development proposals at about the same
time. In 1976, the National Forest Service
issued a draft EIS concerning proposed
leases on land in its charge. The Department also issued an EIS in 1976. The
introduction to the Department's EIS stated that the National Forest Service EIS
dealt with the impacts of oil and gas leasing in the larger area surrounding Coal
Creek, and the Department's EIS would
therefore focus only on the state lands
involved and should be considered "an extension of that made by the federal government" The Department's EIS permitted
leasing of all 14 Coal Creek tracts. However, at a meeting of the State Board of
Land Commissioners held in March of 1976,
all of the bids received were rejected. The
National Forest Service subsequently un-
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dertook a new environmental analysis of
the area, and abandoned its 1976 draft EIS.
In 1982, the Department received new
applications for ofl and gas leases covering
a larger portion of the Coal Greek area.
The Department prepared a preliminary environmental review (PER) for the purpose
of determining whether issuance of oil and
gas leases would be an action by state
government "significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment," therefore requiring an EIS under § 75-1-201,
MCA. The PER was issued in 1983, and
concluded that no such significant effect
would result if certain protective stipulations were included in any leases granted.
The Department then offered leases in
Coal Creek State Forest at public auction.
Cenex purchased leases to 17 tracts. Each
lease contained 16 environmentally protective stipulations. Under these stipulations,
Cenex was required to submit an annual
operating plan to the Department detailing
all activities to be carried out on the leased
acreage during the coming year. No activity could be undertaken untfl written approval of each year's plan was received
from the Department
Cenex's first annual operating plan was
submitted in 1984. The plan proposed drilling an exploratory well on one of the
leased tracts located approximately three
miles south of the town of Polebridge and
one mOe west of Glacier Park. The proposed well site was a clear-cut left from
previous logging under lease from the Department Cenex planned to make improvements to an existing logging road in
order to transport necessary drilling equipment and supplies. The Department delayed approval of the plan while it completed a site-specific PER, held two public
hearings and received comments on the
PER during a 30-day review period. After
reviewing the comments, the Department
issued a supplement to the PER. The Department then approved the plan, subject
to 31 additional protective stipulations.
In February of 1985, North Fork filed
this action. The complaint sought an order
setting aside the Department's approval of
the Cenex operating plan and the Cenex

lease, and a writ of mandate directing the
Department to prepare an EIS on the cumulative effects of ofl and gas development
in the Coal Creek area. Cenex successfully
petitioned to intervene as a defendant in
the case. The Department and Cenex filed
a motion for summary judgment, as did
North Fork. In 1988, the District Court
issued a Memorandum and Order granting
North Fork's motion, and subsequently entered judgment in North Fork's favor.
This appeal followed
The many issues taken up by the parties
have rendered their arguments difficult to
follow. North Fork has gone so far as to
attempt a "chart of corresponding issue
numbers" in its brief to this Court A
careful reading of the issues and arguments offered, as well as the record from
below, shows that the parties are posing
three core questions:
1. Did the District Court apply the proper standard of review?
2. Did the Department proceed properly
in approving Cenex's annual operating
plan?
3. Is mandamus an appropriate remedy
to enforce provisions of the Montana Environmental Policy Act?
We will proceed with our review by addressing these three questions.

[1] The District Court looked to the
Montana Administrative Procedure Act
(MAPA) for its standard of review. The
court applied the standard of review found
in § 2-4-704{2Xe), MCA:
(2) . . . The court may reverse or modify
the decision if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because
the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record.
On appeal, the Department and Cenex argue that the "clearly erroneous" standard
was improper in this case. Cenex specifically argues that § 2-4-704, MCA, was in-
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applicable, because the section deals with
judicial review of "contested cases", and
this was not a contested case. A "contested case" is defined at § 2-4-102(4), MCA,
as a proceeding before an agency where a
"determination of legal rights, duties, or
privileges" of a party is required to be
made after an opportunity for hearing. In
contrast to cases such as State ex rel
Montana
Wilderness Association
v.
Board of Natural Resources and Conservation (1982), 200 Mont 11, 648 P.2d 734,
no hearing was requested or held before
the Department in this case. North Fork
did not initiate this action until after the
Department had approved Cenex's operating plan. There was no "evidentiary
record" against which to measure the Department's decision and determine whether
it was clearly erroneous. Cenex is therefore correct in asserting that § 2-4-704,
MCA, does not apply in this case.
Both Cenex and the Department argue
that the District Court should have employed an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. The Department asserts that decisions by administrative agencies are given
deference by reviewing courts due to the
agencies' access to superior expertise, and
are not overturned unless arbitrary or capricious. The Department notes that in
Wilderness Association, 648 P.2d at 740,
this Court cited deference to agency expertise as one of three important factors in
selecting a standard of review in a contested case. Cenex notes that the arbitrary
and capricious standard was used prior to
the enactment of MAPA, and would logically apply in this case. Our decision in Langen v. Badlands Cooperative State Grazing District (1951), 125 Mont 302, 308, 234
P.2d 467, 470, which is cited by Cenex, is
relevant to both points:
The review by the district court is only
for the purpose of determining the legal
rights of the parties involved. This is so
because of the division of governmental
powers under the Constitution, neither
the district court nor the Supreme Court
may substitute their discretion for the
discretion reposed in boards and commissions by the legislative acts, [citations]

mm

The appeal from the commission to the
district court is for the purpose merely of
determining whether upon the evidence
and the law the action of the commission
is based upon an error of law, or is
wholly unsupported by the evidence, or
clearly arbitrary or capricious. On such
review courts will only inquire insofar as
to ascertain if the board or commission
has stayed within the statutory bounds
and has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously
or unlawfully, [citations]
Both sides agree that because the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) is
modeled after its federal counterpart
(NEPA), this Court can look to federal decisions under NEPA as an aid to addressing
cases under MEPA. See Kadillak v. Anaconda Co. (1979), 184 Mont 127, 602 P.2d
147. In fact, North Fork argues that we
should adopt the "reasonableness" standard utilized by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in cases cited in North
Fork's brief. While looking to federal decisions is not always conclusive, cases decided on analogous facts can shed light on a
given issue.
The United States Supreme CJourt recently took up two companion cases involving
the issues at bar. In one of those cases;
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council — U.S.
, 109 S.Ct 1851, 104
L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the proper standard
for review of an agency decision not to
amend a previously-issued EIS. The argument before the Court was that newly-discovered information cast doubt on the
agency's previous conclusion tjiat the proposed project would not significantly affect
the environment The agency involved had
decided that the information did not raise
questions sufficient to require amendment
of the EIS.
This case presents an analogous question. North Fork alleged several specific
shortcomings in the procedure followed by
the Department in approving Cenex's annual operating plan. The thrust of these
contentions, when taken together, is that
the information gathered by the Depart
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lenged by North Fork: the approval of
ment indicated that Cenex's proposed well
Cenex9 Annual Operating Plan, which calls
would generate a significant impact on the
for the drilling of an exploratory well.
human environment, and an EIS should
North Fork has contended, and the District
have been prepared.
Court has held, that this action should not
As in any comparison between federal have been undertaken without prior prepaand Montana law, there is a distinction ration of an EIS. It is apparent from our
between Marsh and this case. In Marsh, review of the record, however, that the
the federal Administrative Procedure Act arguments of counsel and the District
was applicable where in this case MAP A Court's Memorandum and Order have
judicial review provisions do not apply. strayed from the issue of the operating
However, the federal act offers several plan to consider policies and activities that
possible standards of review. In choosing are not at issue here. This is a primary
a standard, the Supreme Court in Marsh reason for our reversal of the District
specifically rejected the "reasonableness" Court's judgment
standard used by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals and adopted the "arbitrary and A. The Department's Decision Was Not
capricious" standard. In explaining its
Unlawful
choice, the Court stated:
[21 While the standard of review we
The question presented for review in have adopted utilizes three terms, it breaks
this case is a classic example of a factual down into two basic parts. One part condispute the resolution of which implicates cerns whether the agency action could be
substantial agency expertise
Be- held unlawful, and the other concerns
cause analysis of the relevant documents whether it could be held arbitrary or capri"requires a high level of technical exper- cious. See Langen, 234 P.2d at 471. We
tise," we must defer to "the informed will first address the "unlawful" portion.
discretion of the responsible federal The Department is both empowered and
agencies." [citations]
constrained by a set of statutes and regulaThe Department in this case was carry- tions relevant to its actions challenged in
ing out its statutorily-imposed fiduciary this case. One such statute is § 77-1-202,
duty to "secure the largest measure of MCA, cited above, which imposes a fiducilegitimate and reasonable advantage to the ary duty on the Department to manage the
state" in managing school trust lands. land at issue to the advantage of the State.
Section 77-1-202, MCA. The Department The procedures followed by the Departalso had to carry out duties imposed by ment in its dealings with Cenex were govMEPA, pursuant to which it prepared a erned in part by MEPA (§§ 75-1-101, et
PER in order to gather information for its seq., MCA) and administrative rules enactdecision on whether to prepare an ELS for ed pursuant to MEPA (ARM 26.2.602, et
Cenex's proposed action. This decision seq. repealed 11/1/89; recodified at ARM
necessarily involved expertise not pos- 26.2.642, et seq.).
sessed by courts and is part of a duty
North Fork's complaint in the District
assigned to the Department, not the courts. Court alleged in large part that the DepartIn light of this, and the cases cited above, ment failed to carry out its appointed
we hold that the standard of review to be duties under these provisions. In the brief
applied by the trial court and this Court is filed in support of its motion for summary
whether the record establishes that the judgment, North Fork made three arguagency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or ments:
unlawfully.
1. [The Department's] decision to forego an EIS at the stage of drilling an oil
well was clearly unreasonable and
When applying the above standard of
wrong. Conner v. Burford, 605 F-Supp.
review to this case, it is important to keep
107 (Dlfontl985) and Kadiliak v. Anain mind which Department action is chal-

n.
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conda Co. (1979), 184 Mont 127, 602
P.2d 147.
2. The case is clearly one where the
decision "may significantly affect" endangered species and a fragile environment, requiring an EIS under ARM 26.2.603(3Xa).
3. [The Department] omitted to perform
an evaluation of cumulative impacts, in
violation of ARM 26.2.604(l)(b) and (c).
Two of these arguments, the first and
third, are directly relevant to the "unlawful" portion of our standard of review.
The District Court's Reliance on Conner v. BurfonL The District Court agreed
with North Fork's first argument, and relied on Conner v. Burford, supra, to hold
the Department's 1976 EIS, 1983 PER and
1984 PER to be insufficient. At the outset,
the court adopted North Fork's broad view
of the development of oil and gas in the
Coal Creek area, and concluded that fullfield development required the preparation
of an EIS. The Department had argued
that its 1976 EIS was sufficient for this
purpose. The court found, however, that
the 1976 EIS was insufficient because it
focused only on Coal Creek lease tracts and
did not address the overall impacts of such
development Without a valid EIS, the two
PER's became "falling dominos," their environmentally protective stipulations mere
examples of the kind of "piecemeal" approach to environmental review held improper in Conner. We disagree.
First, the Department's 1976 EIS has no
relevance to this case. The overall impacts
of full-field oil and gas development in the
Coal Creek State Forest are not at issue.
Section 7&-1-201, MCA, (entitled "General
Directions—Environmental Impact Statements") sets out guidelines for "every recommendation or report on proposals for
projects." ARM 26.2.603 ("Determination
of Necessity for Environmental Impact
Statement") governs consideration of a
"proposed
action".
The
proposed
project/action under consideration in this
case is the drilling of one exploratory well
on one lease tract In considering this
proposed action, the Department prepared
a site-specific PER in 1984, which supple-

mented a more general PER prepared in
1983. The conclusion reached by the Department was that an EIS was not required
for the single Cenex test well. This is the
decision under review.
Second, while the District Court was correct in asserting that "[i]f found rich in oil
and gas the acreage in question would be
under tremendous pressure for further exploration and development," it was premature in concluding that an EIS was required. The court's conclusion apparently
resulted from a misreading of the Conner
case. The decision of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana in Conner, cited by North Fork in its brief below,
dealt with the question of when an agency
action would "significantly affect" the environment, thus requiring preparation of an
EIS. This is the same standard employed
in § 75-1-201, MCA, and its attendant regulations. The Federal District Court held
that issuance of a lease permitting oil and
gas development was "the first stage of a
number of successive steps" leading to development, and therefore met the "significantly affect" standard. The court feared
that proceeding with a piecemeal environmental review by considering only one step
at a time would ignore the cumulative effects of development and risk unforeseen,
irreversible impacts.
When reviewing the decision, however,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made an
important distinction. The appellate court
reviewed case law determining that under
the "significantly affect" standard, an EIS
was always required at the "go/no go"
point of oil and gas development The test
derived to pinpoint when the "go/no go"
point is reached looks for the proposed
action that will entaO an "irretrievable commitment of resources". Some of the leases
at issue in Conner had "no surface occupancy" (NSO) clauses. Under these clauses, no activity which would disturb the
ground in any way could be undertaken
without prior approval from the agency
involved. The Ninth Circuit Court held
that leases with NSO clauses were not an
irretrievable commitment of resources.
Nothing could happen under the leases
without government approval. The point
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(Emphasis
supplied.)
It is & fundamental
principle of contract law that written or
typewritten provisions in a contract take
precedence over printed provisions. Hoerner Waldorf Corp. v. Bumstead-Woolford
Co. (1972), 158 Mont 472, 494 P.2d 293.
The typed "special provision" therefore
takes precedence over the printed authoriCenex will operate under essentially the zation in this lease. Cenex can carry out
same type of strictures found in the Con- the listed activities only with prior written
ner NSO leases. The lease at issue in this approval of the Department. The issuance
case was executed on a printed "Montana of this lease was thus not an "irretrievable
Oil and Gas Lease" form supplemented in commitment of resources" as the term was
blank spaces with information specific to used in Conner. The District Court was
the lease arrangement between the Depart- incorrect in concluding that full development and Cenex for this well site. North ment of oil and gas in the Coal Creek State
Fork has made much of the printed lan- Forest was a matter of successive steps set
guage in the initial portion of the lease into irreversible motion by the issuance of
indicating that Cenex thereby acquires the the lease. Lake the Ninth Circuit in Conner, this Court cannot assume that the
right to do the following:
. . . mining and operating for oil and gas, Department will not comply with its MEPA
and of laying pipelines, building tanks, obligations if development proceeds beyond
this stage.
power stations, and other structures
The 1983 PER. The District Court's misthereon necessary in order to produce,
application of the Conner decision also
save, care for, dispose of and remove the
tainted its holdings that the 1983 and 1984
oil and gas . . .
PER's were insufficient Because the 1984
According to North Fork, it is hard to PER is a "supplement" to the 1983 PER,
imagine these activities not significantly the court's holdings on both documents are
affecting the human environment of the relevant The court held the 1983 PER
Coal Creek area.
inadequate because it relied on the incluNorth Fork is correct in that the lease sion of environmentally protective stipulacould ultimately empower Cenex to conduct tions to support its finding that issuing
all of the listed activities, and it is easy to leases would not significantly affect the
imagine these activities having a signifi- human environment The District Court
cant effect on the environment However, held this approach insufficient for two reathe lease also contains specific environmen- sons: (1) it represented piecemealing prohibited by Conner and (2) it should have
tal
stipulations typed
tai Stipulations
vyprru into
w w the
w«^ lease
«^<-~w .form
u*^«v^x» ~ , w~

had not been reached where preparation of
an EIS was "automatic." The court also
noted, "We cannot assume that government agencies will not comply with their
NEPA obligations in later stages of development" Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d
1521 at 1528 (9th Cir.1988).

under paragraph 26, entitled "Special Provisions". One of these typed stipulations
reads:
If the lessee .[Cenex] intends to conduct
any activities on the leased premises, it
shall submit to the Department of State
Lands two copies of an Annual Operating Plan or Amendment to an existing
Operating Plan, describing its proposed
activities for the coming year. No activities shall occur on the tract until an
Annuai Operating Plan or Amendments have been approved in writing
by the Commissioner of State Lands or
his designated representative.

been a "programmatic" review as required
by ARM 26.2.614
Our discussion of Conner has shown
that a lease issued pursuant to the 1983
PER need not be violative of the ruling in
Conner, and the lease involved here in fact
was not As to ARM 26.2.614, the court
engaged in selective reading of this rule,
which has resulted in misinterpretation.
The court and North Fork have at several
points focused on portions of relevant provisions utilizing the words "shall" or
"must" to conclude that the Department
failed to carry out mandatory procedures.
However, a cursory examination of ARM
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26.2.614 reveals that the procedures listed
are subject to a very prominent "if*:
(1) If the department is contemplating a
series of agency-initiated actions [which]
will constitute a major state action significantly affecting the human environment,
the department may prepare a programmatic review . . .
(Emphasis supplied.) Again, our discussion
above shows that the contemplated action
at issue in the 1983 PER was the issuance
of leases, which the Department determined did not constitute state actions significantly affecting the human environment That decision was not challenged by
North Fork, so no programmatic review
was required.
The 1984 PER. The District Court
adopted North Fork's third argument in
holding the 1984 PER to be insufficient
North Fork asserted that under ARM 26.2.604, an evaluation of the cumulative impacts of the proposed action was mandatory. The District Court found the 1984 PER
insufficient because of its failure to address cumulative impacts.
The term "cumulative impacts" is defined in ARM 26.2.602(1). The rule states
that analysis of cumulative impacts under
this definition involves consideration of
past and present actions related to the proposed action. The proposed action under
consideration in the 1984 PER was the
drilling of the test well, the first such well
in the Coal Creek area. The only past
related action was the issuance of leases to
Cenex, which was the subject of the 1983
PER. The 1983 and 1984 PER's fulfill the
requirement of ARM 26.2.604 in that they
examine the impacts of issuing leases and
drilling a single test well, the only related
proposed actions before the Department
The arguments advanced by North Fork
and the District Court's Memorandum attack the 1984 PER for failing to consider
the cumulative impacts of related future
actions, namely the full-field development
of oil and gas. However, ARM 26.2.604
requires consideration of related future actions only when they are under current
consideration. As we stated above, fullfield development was not a proposed ac-

tion before the Department It was not
included in Cenex's Annual Operating Plan,
and therefore was not under "current consideration".
In sum, the arguments advanced by
North Fork and the rationale provided by
the District Court failed to show that the
Department acted "unlawfully** in determining that approval of Cenex' first annual
operating plan did not require an EIS. Our
review of the record has not uncovered any
statute or regulation violated by the Department in its dealings with Cenex thus
far. The Department has followed required procedures and included in its
PER's the information required by statute
and administrative rules. Nor can the decision on the Cenex test well be analogized to
the situation in Conner. Even under the
Conner criteria, the Department made its
decision to forego an EIS at a point in the
process where that decision was ^till left to
the Department's discretion. We! therefore
proceed to examine the Department's decision under the "arbitrary or capricious"
portion of our standard of revie^v.
B. The Department's Decision Was Not
Arbitrary Or Capricious.
[3] North Fork's second argument in its
brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment addressed the 1984 PEfe, and is
relevant to this portion of our review.
North Fork asserted that by the Department's own analysis, the approval of the
well was an action significantly affecting
the human environment North Fork is
critical of the Department's treatment of
the effects the well might have! on bald
eagles, grizzly bears or greyi wolves
thought to inhabit or at least frequent the
Coal Creek area. North Fork notes that
the Department employs no eagle biologist
or wolf biologist, and no wildlife biologist is
included in the list of PER preparers.
However, North Fork's brief states,
The issue here is not the questionable
quality of the [eagle, bear and wolf] biology in the PER. The issue is whether
there is a "may affect" situation . . .
According to North Fork, such a situation
"clearly" exists, and an EIS should have
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In response to this process, the Department decided to include measures to mitigate the impact of oil and gas activities in
the form of stipulations to Cenex's lease
and to the written approval of Cenex's operating plan. The Department has argued
that these stipulations prevented its approval of the operating plan from rising to
the level of a state action significantly affecting the human environment At the
federal level, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that such "mitigation
measures" are to be considered in reviewing a decision to forego an EIS, and if the
measures are "significant", they may justify such a decision under the "unreasonable" standard. Friends of Endangered
Species, Inc. v. Jantzen (9th Cir.1985), 760
F.2d 976, 987. Given the narrower, "arbitrary or capricious" standard being applied
in this case, sufficiently significant mitigation measures certainly would justify the
Department's decision.
The mitigation measures adopted by the
Department have taken the form of a total
of 42 protective stipulations, 11 attached to
the lease and 31 attached to the approval of
the operating plan. They include such
measures as forbidding any activity on the
lease tract during times of the year important to bald eagle nesting and grizzly bear
migration. The drilling rig must be painted a color that will not stand out against
the natural background, additional mufflers must be installed on the diesel engines used to power the rig, and the engines must be mounted facing a certain
direction to reduce the noise reaching bald
eagle nests and Glacier Park. Five stipulations deal with any necessary disturbance
of the soil and its replacement Eight stipulations concern maintaining the quality of
the ground water, and include restrictions
on the chemical content of drilling fluids
and the size of trucks that may be used to
haul diesel fuel to the rig. The stipulations
also address the workers on the rig, imposing regulations on garbage disposal and
forbidding the presence of personal pets,
among other measures.
We have reviewed the concerns raised by
the preparers of the PER's, as well as
those raised by agencies consulted and

members of the public. We have also reviewed the mitigation measures imposed by
the Department We conclude that the Department has considered the concerns
raised and taken significant steps to address them. We therefore hold that the
Department's decision to approve Cenex's
annual operating plan was not arbitrary,
nor was it an exercise of caprice. Having
also held that the Department did not act
illegally, we therefore uphold the Department's decision and reverse the District
Court on this question.
III.
[4] One of the remedies afforded by the
District Court was a writ of mandate requiring the Department to prepare an EIS.
We have held above that an EIS was not
requited in this case, which makes the issuance of the writ erroneous. We feel
compelled to add, however, that mandamus
was an inappropriate remedy in this case.
As our discussion above has brought out,
the Department's decision to forego an EIS
at this stage of development was necessarily an exercise of discretion to which courts
must give a measure of deference. In fact,
we have previously held that the Department must exercise its discretion in all
phases of its management of state lands.
"If the 'large measure of legitimate and
reasonable advantage' from the use of
state land is to accrue to the state, then
the [Department] must, necessarily, have
a large discretionary power. Every facet
of the [Department's] action cannot, and
is not, explicitly laid out in the statutes
of the State Constitution."
Jeppeson t?. State (1983), 205 Mont 282,
289, 667 P.2d 428, 431 (quoting Thompson
v. Babcock (1966), 147 Mont 46, 409 P.2d
808). We held in Jeppeson that mandamus
is not available to compel a discretionary
act We therefore reverse the District
Court on this question.
We have held that the District Court
applied the incorrect standard of review in
this case, and that under the correct standard, the Department's approval of Cenex's
annual operating plan was proper. We
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to allow drilling prior to the compilation of
an EIS.
I would affirm the District Court
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chase would not cure health problem of
dairy herd and that new machines would
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repay loan.
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Torger S. Oaas, Lewistown, for plaintiffs
and appellants.
Donald C. Robinson and Mark W. Hattioli, Poore, Roth and Robinson, Butte, for
defendants and respondents.
Julius R. TRESCH and Joan Tresch,
Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
NORWEST BANK OF LEWISTOWN,
N.A^ John Doe Corporation, I through
V, and John Doe 1 through 10, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 89-053.
Supreme Court of Montana.
Submitted on Briefs Aug. 3, 1989.

MCDONOUGH, justice.
Julius Tresch and Joan Tresch (Tresch)
appeal from an order of the Tenth Judicial
District, Fergus County, granting summary judgment to respondent Norwest Bank
of Lewistown, NA. (Norwest). We affirm.
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether Norwest breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it denied a $3,100.00 Joan requested by Tresch.

Decided Aug. 25, 1989.

2. Whether Norwest breached a fiduciary duty owed Tresch when it denied the
$3,100.00 loan.

Farmer brought action against lender
when lender refused to advance additional
loan money. The District Court, Tenth Judicial District, Fergus County, Peter Rapkoch, J., granted lender's summary judgment motion, and farmer appealed. The
Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that
(1) lender did not breach implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) lender did not breach fiduciary duty.
Affirmed.

Julius and Joan Tresch have owned and
operated a dairy farm near Lewistown,
Montana since 1966. For over three decades, they have done their banking business with Norwest In 1983, Tresch increased his operating loan at Norwest to
the amount of approximately $147,000.00.
This note was to be paid in monthly installments and was secured by an assignment
of proceeds from the dairy, and other collateral. One of the terms of this financing
agreement provided that Tresch could not
make any capital purchase in excess of
$500.00 without the express consent of
Norwest

1. Banks and Banking *»100
Lender bank did not breach any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to advance farmer additional loan money for milking equipment
lender determined was unnecessary.
2. Banks and Banking *=»100
Lender's decision not to advance farmer additional loan money to purchase milking equipment was not a breach of fiduciary duty when it based decision on conclusion that farmer's proposed machine pur-
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Shortly after receiving this loan, Tresch
used advanced funds to upgrade the equipment in his dairy. This upgrading included
the purchase of new milking machines.
Tresch quickly became dissatisfied with
these machines, because he believed that
they were responsible for an outbreak of
"mastitis" in his dairy herd.
Mastitis is defined as an inflammation of
the mammary glands in dairy cattle. It is
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DEER VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 97 OF MARICOPA
COUNTY, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Honorable Ruth Hilliard, a
Judge Thereof, Respondent Judge,
STATE of Arizona, ex rel., Robert K.
LANE, Commissioner, State Land
Department, Real Party in Interest.
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No. CV-8S-0577-T.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
June 30, 1988.

Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell
by Kenneth C. Sundlof, Jr., Douglas G.
JZimmerinan, Gary L. Lassen, Phoenix, for
petitioner.
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Melinda
JL Gai+ahan, Michael N. Harrison, Phoenix,
for real party in interest.
Larry J. Richmond, Ltd. by Larry J.
Jlichm^nd, Julie M. Lemmon, Phoenix, for
amicus curiae Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Qounty.
Johnson & Shelley by J. LaMar Shelley,
Robert M. Jarrett, Jr., Phoenix, for amicus
curiae League of Arizona Cities and Towns.
Arizona School Boards Ass'n by Robert
% Jarfett, Jr., Phoenix, for amicus curiae
Arizona School Boards Assn.

Reconsideration Denied Sept. 20, 1988.
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FELt)MAN, Vice Chief Justice.
School district filed action seeking to
condemn parcel owned by state school
trust. The Superior Court of Maricopa
County, Ruth Hilliard, J., dismissed complaint, and district appealed. Upon transfer of appeal, the Supreme Court, Feldman,
V.CJ., held that Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act did not prevent acquisition of
school trust property by condemnation, but
State Constitution did.
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Affirmed.

1. Eminent Domain *»47(1)
Under the Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act, Arizona school district could
acquire parcel of school trust land by condemnation without complying with the
Act's express language regarding public
notice and public auction. Enabling Act,
§ 28, 36 Stat 557.

RON,

2. Eminent Domain *=>47(1)
Under the Arizona Constitution, Arizona school district could not acquire parcel
of school trust land by condemnation because such acquisition would not allow additional profit to trust that might come
from competitive bidding at advertised public auction. A.R.S. Const. Art 10, § 1 et
seq.
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to a party
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This case requires us to review the propriety of a school district's condemnation of
state school trust land, a matter of first
impression in our state. We transferred
the appeal to this court to examine important questions concerning the disposition of
our state school trust lands. Rule 19, Ariz.
R.Civ.App.P., 17A A.R.S. We have jurisdiction under Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and
A.R.S. $ 12-120.24.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Plaintiff, Deer Valley Unified School District ("Deer Valley"), is located in northern
Maricopa County. Due to a dramatic rise
in elementary school student enrollments in
the eastern portion of their district, Deer
Valley officials investigated possible sites
for a n£w school in that area. They finally
located a suitable fifteen-acre parcel owned
by the state school trust. Deer Valley
contacted the Arizona State Land Department fthe "Department") to see if the district could obtain the land. Howe,ver, the
Department preferred to hold the property
in the hope of obtaining a higher yield for
the state school trust through future commercial leases. The Department refused to
hold a public auction and allow Deer Valley
$Xi opportunity to buy the property.
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When further negotiations proved fruitless, Deer Valley filed an action seeking to
condemn the proposed school*site. The
action was brought under the eminent domain provisions of A.R.S. §§ 12-1111 et
seq. In its complaint, Deer Valley also
sought an interlocutory order allowing it to
take immediate possession of the property
upon the deposit of money or the posting of
a bond. A.R.S. § 12-1116. The trial court
issued an order requiring the Department
to show cause why Deer Valley should not
take immediate possession of the property.
See A.R.S. § 12-1116. When the Department moved to dismiss the complaint, the
trial court vacated the show cause hearing
and granted the dismissal motion.
The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that the proposed condemnation violated § 28 of the Arizona-New
Mexico Enabling Act, Act of June 20,1910,
Pub.L. No. 219 (ch. 310), 36 Stat. 557 (the
"Enabling Act") and its rescript in Ariz.
Const art 10. Those provisions prohibit
the sale of state school trust lands for less
than the appraised true value to the highest and best bidder at a duly advertised
public auction. The trial court concluded
that these rules applied in full to acquisitions by eminent domain, effectively preventing the condemnation of school trust
land. The court concluded also that condemnation would deprive the Department
of the opportunity to obtain a price higher
than the appraised value, hinder the Department's obligation to manage and maximize the trust benefits and give Deer Valley trust benefits to the detriment of other
beneficiaries. Finally, the court ruled that
the school trust land did not belong to the
state and was therefore not subject to condemnation under A.R.S. § 12-1114. The
court held, therefore, that neither the state
nor its subdivisions could condemn land
held in the school trust.

gument, on July 23, 1986 the court of appeals declined to accept special action jurisdiction without comment as to the merits of
the case. The appeal itself became at issue
in the court of appeals on September 30,
1986. Deer Valley sought relief from this
court either by review of the denial of
special action jurisdiction or by transfer of
the appeal. We denied special action review, but ordered transfer of the appeal to
this court. Rule 19, Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17A
A.R.S.
DISCUSSION
The central issue in this case is whether
either the Enabling Act or the Arizona
Constitution allows Deer Valley to condemn state school trust land.
A. The State School Trust Lands
As Arizona approached statehood in
1910, Congress proposed to transfer millions of acres of federal land directly to the
new state for the support of its common
schools. Enabling Act § 24. Congress
had made similar grants to other states
with untoward results. Some states improvidently leased and sold their lands with
little or no benefit to the public schools.
See Murphy v. State, 65 Ariz. 338, 351,181
P.2d 336, 344 (1947). As a result, when
Congress agreed to give the land to Arizona, it required Arizona to accept and hold
the land in trust and prohibited the sale or
other disposal of such trust land except
under extremely restrictive and detailed
conditions. See Kadish v. Arizona State
Land Department, 155 Ariz. 484, 487, 747
P.2d 1183, 1186 (1987).

The members of Arizona's constitutional
convention fully appreciated the value of
the proposed school grant. The delegates
therefore drafted an unambiguous clause
accepting
the gift and restrictions of the
Deer Valley filed a timely notice of apEnabling
Act
peal and sought special action relief * in the
The State of Arizona and its people
court of appeals. The court of appeals
stayed the appeal pending resolution of the
hereby consent to all and singular the
special action. After briefing and oral arprovisions of the Enabling Act . . . con1. In Arizona, relief formerly obtained by writs
of prohibition, mandamus or certiorari is now
obtained by "special action." Rule 1, Arizona

Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, 17A
AILS.
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cerning the lands thereby granted or confirmed to the State, the terms and conditions upon which said grants and confirmations are made, and the means and
manner of enforcing such terms and conditions, all in every respect and particular as in the aforesaid Enabling Act provided.
Ariz. Const, art. 20, 1112.
The framers of our constitution, however, went beyond mere acceptance of the
terms and benefits of a federal statute.
They independently replicated the essential
restrictions of the Enabling Act in Article
10 of the Arizona Constitution. In a special direct election held February 8, 1911,
the people of Arizona approved their convention's constitution by a vote of 12,187 to
3,822. Constitution Ratification, Phoenix
Arizona Republican, Feb. 10, 1911, at 1, col.
3; Canvass of the Returns, Phoenix Arizona Republican, Feb. 28,1911, at 1, col. 1, 2.
When Arizona ultimately attained statehood on February 14, 1912, the constitutional conditions and limits on the management and disposal of the state school trust
lands became part of Arizona's "fundamental law." Union Oil Co. of Arizona v.
Norton-Morgan Commercial Co., 23 Ariz.
236, 241, 202 P. 1077, 1079 (1922).
Congress has periodically amended the
Enabling Act to allow Arizona more flexible use of its school trust land. See, e.g.,
Act of June 5, 1936, Pub.L. No. 658 (ch.
517), 49 Stat 1477; Act of June 2, 1951,
Pub.L. No. 44 (ch. 120), 65 Stat. 50. These
amendments were normally the result of
specific requests for change channeled
through Arizona's congressional delegation. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 1939, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R.Rep. No. 2615,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S.Rep. No. 194,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R.Rep. No.
429, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 97 Cong.
Rec. 362&-29, 5731-32 (1951) (floor debates).
In each case, the Arizona electorate voted to change the Arizona Constitution to
take advantage of the prior revision in the
federal statutory law. See, e.g., 1940 Ariz.
Sess.Laws, Initiative and Referendum Measures, at 392-93 (amending Ariz. Const.

mmmm

art. 10, § 3); 1951 Ariz.Sess.Laws, Initiative and Referendum Measures, at 483-85
(same). See also Boice v. Campbell, 30
Ariz. 424, 428, 248 P. 34, 35 (1926).
Thus, at all times since Arizona joined
the Union, there havfc been two complementary levels of protection against improvident state legislative or executive disposal
of Arizona's school tifust land. The dispositive issue in the present case is whether
either the Enabling; Act or the Arizona
Constitution allows a state school district
to condemn a tract of Arizona's school
trust land.
B. The Enabling A<k
[1] The Enabling Act is a federal law.
It provides a minimum guarantee for the
integrity of state school trust land. Like
the analogous provisions in the Arizona
Constitution, § 28 of the Enabling Act ostensibly requires that the state only sell or
dispose of school trust land at a duly advertised public auction following appraisal.
However, the United States Supreme Court
has declined to give effect to the literal
protections of the Enabling Act.
The United States Supreme Court confirmed an emphatic incursion on the explicit language of the Enabling Act in Lassen
v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Department, 385 U.S. 4^8, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17
L.Ed.2d 515 (1967). In ihat case, in accordance with the plain terins of the Enabling
Act, the state land department attempted
to force the state and County highway departments to pay for material sites and
easements on state school trust land. This
would have curtailed a fifty-year practice
to the contrary. The st^te highway department successfully challenged this change
by judicial action. The Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed, reasoning that the easements and material sites did no damage to
trust land and actually created an overall
benefit to the trust and to the state. State
v. Lassen, 99 Ariz. 161, 4^)7 P.2d 747 (1965).
Thus, the Court held that the state could
acquire highway easements across school
trust land without payment Id. The state
land department then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

ii?
I ill
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On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court first noted our view that the Enabling Act restrictions were inapplicable to
state acquisitions of less than a fee interest
and stated that this "contention [was]
plainly foreclosed" by the language of the
act which expressly applies to "[e]very
sale, lease, conveyance or contract." Lassen, 385 U.S. at 462 n. 6, 87 S.Ct. at 586 n.
6. The Court held, further, that Congress
had intended to ensure full compensation to
the trust fund from any use or disposal of
the trust land. Id. at 463, 87 S.Ct at 587.
Therefore, the state was required to pay
"full compensation"—appraised value—
"for the land it uses." Id. at 465, 87 S.Ct
at 588.
Although it took a strict view of the full
compensation provision of the Enabling
Act, the Court declined to literally construe
the public notice, public auction and high
bid provisions of the same Act Reasoning
that the latter restrictions were intended to
guarantee only that the trust fund would
receive "appropriate compensation for
trust lands," the Court concluded that it
was unnecessary to impose such conditions
"on transfers in which the abuses they
were intended to prevent are not likely to
occur." Id. at 464, 87 S.Ct at 587. The
Court held, therefore, that "Arizona need
not offer public notice or conduct a public
sale" on acquisitions of trust lands by the
state highway department Id. at 465, 87
S.Ct at 588. The Court's holding on this
point was reinforced by its belief that the
public notice/public sale provisions of the
Enabling Act were useless in an acquisition
by a state agency because the state eventually could condemn the land in any event
Id. at 464, 87 S.Ct at 587.
The conclusion to be drawn from Lassen,
of course, is that the federal act allows a
state agency to acquire an interest in
school trust land by either negotiation or
condemnation. On any such acquisition,
the agency must pay appraised value, but
need not comply with the express language
of the Enabling Act requiring public notice
and public auction. If all that were involved in the present case was the interpretation of federal law, the Lassen interpretation of the Enabling Act would be bind-

ing precedent However, we must answer
to another authority-i-the Arizona Constitution.
C. The Arizona Constitution
[2] When Arizona accepted the school
trust land from Congress, the people of our
state agreed to hold and dispose of this
valuable asset only as provided in the Enabling Act and in the state constitution,
and only for the educational goals outlined
in the grant Ariz.l Const, art. 10, § 1.
Our state charter plainly says that the
state may not sell, lease or otherwise dispose of school trust land other than to the
highest and best bidder at a duly advertised public auction. Ariz. Const art. 10,
§§ 3-4. In no event may the state transfer
the land for less than its appraised value.
Id.
Condemnation of state school trust land
ensures that the school trust will at least
receive the judicially) verified appraised value of the condemned! land. See, e.g., In re
Condemnation of Lands in St Louis
County, 124 Minn.|271, 277-78, 144 N.W.
960, 962 (1914). However, the exercise of
eminent domain does not allow the additional profit to the trust which may come
from competitive bidding at an advertised
public auction. Gladden Farms, Inc. v.
State, 129 Ariz. 51^, 520, 633 P.2d 325, 329
(1981). This is particularly true in the vicinity of our perpetually expanding urban
areas, where the most expert appraisal
might underestimate the true demand for
an undeveloped barcel of real estate.
Therefore, wise puplic policy encourages us
to adhere to the ^alutary protections contained in our state charter.
Of course, eveiji if we questioned the
continuing wisdod of the trust restrictions
enumerated in our constitution, we are obligated to implement them.
Gladden
Farms, 129 Ariz, at 521, 633 P.2d at 330.
See also Stillma\i v. Marston, 107 Ariz.
208, 209, 484 P.$d 628, 629 (1971). We
have no right to delete terms from the
plain language of its text See, e.g., Bohannan v. Corporation Commission, 82
Ariz. 299, 302, 813 P.2d 379, 381 (1957).
The Arizona Constitution clearly describes
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public auction as the proper method of
disposal of our school trust land. Gladden
Farms, supra. We cannot permit disposals that do not fit within the scope of the
enumerated methods. Id.; Morris v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 2A Ariz.
App. 454, 456, 539 P.2d 928, 930 (1975).
Lassen holds that condemnation is a permissible method of disposal. With all due
respect for the views the United States
Supreme Court expressed in Lassen, we
decline to follow that case in interpreting
the identical language in the Arizona Constitution. We make this decision as a matter of state law on independent state
grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1037-44, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3474-78, 77
L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Although we fully
understand the reasoning of the Supreme
Court, we firmly believe that we may not
ignore the express words contained in the
Arizona Constitution. Our constitution requires public notice, public auction and sale
to the highest and best bidder. The words
are plain and specific, and accomplish practical goals that the Lassen rule overlooks.
The Enabling Act, as interpreted in Lassen,
merely sets out the minimum protection for
our state trust land. We independently
conclude that our state constitution does
much more. Our view does create some
divergence between state and federal interpretations of substantially identical provisions of organic laws:
We acknowledge that uniformity is desirable. However, the concept of federalism assumes the power, and duty, of
independence in interpreting our own organic law. With all deference, therefore,
we cannot and should not follow federal
precedent blindly.
Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108,
677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984). See also Feldman
& Abney, The Double Security of Federalism, 20 ARIZ.ST.LJ. 1, 4 (1988).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the state may not dispose of its school trust lands other than by
2. Because of our disposition of this matter on
constitutional grounds, we do not reach the
question whether a school district might statuto-

compliance wi^h the specific terms and conditions of the Arizona Constitution.2 Condemnation do^s not fit within Arizona's
constitutional framework, nor does it guarantee the highest possible return for the
trust. We therefore affirm the trial
court's dismissal of this action.
GORDON, <pJ., and CAMERON and
HOLOHAN, JLJ., concur.
MOELLER, J., did not participate in
the determination of this matter.
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STATE of Arizona, Through the CRIMINAL DIVISION OF the ATTORNEY
GENERALS OFFICE, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Honorable Daniel E. Nastro, a
Judge thereof, Respondent Judge,
Elden GARDNER, Real Party
in Interest.
No. CV-87-0111-PR.
Supretne Court of Arizona,
En Banc.
July 19, 1988.
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 20, 1988.
Caucasian criminal defendant objected
to prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike black veniremen. The Superior Court, Maricopa County, Cause No.
CR-155598, Daniel E. Nastro, J., required
prosecutor to disclose reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, and State
sought special action relief. The Court of
Appeals, Jac^bson, J., 753 P.2d 1168, denied relief, ahd State sought review. The
rily condemn non-trust state land in appropriate
circumstances.
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5575, such statutes of limitation having no application to land
granted by Congress for the support of common schools.*

Nor is there a n y merit in the contention that t h e Commisnothing

in our statute

m a k e specific

findings.

findings.

There is

requiring the Commission
W h i l e it should make

4.

to

8

findings

do so. W e have n o d o u b t that, in case it were requested b y
findings,

it w o u l d , h o w e v e r , d o s o .

In view of w h a t h a s been said it follows that this proceedi n g s h o u l d b e d i s m i s s e d , a n d t h e a w a r d of t h e C o m m i s s i o n
s h o u l d b e , a n d i t a c c o r d i n g l y i s , affirmed.
C O R F M A N , C. J . , a n d W E B E R ,

5.

GIDEON, and THUR6.

WAGONER

STATE

v. W I H T M O R E

BOARD

OF LAND

7.

STATUTES

OF LIMITATION

HAD BURDEN OF SHOWING W H Y

PLEADED »Y DEFENDANTS

WERE

EVIDENCE:—JUDICIAL

NOTICE T A K E N

THAT

STATE

LAND

I S NOT

TAXED. The court will take judicial notice of the fact land w a s
not taxed a s long a s the title remained in the state.
3.

ADVERSE

POSSESSION—NOT

APPEAL

OF DAMAGES

AND ERROR—FINDINGS

FOR DETENTION

STATED.

In

ON CONFLICTING

EVIDENCE NOT

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—STATUTES RELATING TO CLAIMS

INAP-

PLICABLE. In ejectment, in which the defendants claimed title
by adverse possession under Comp. Laws 1917, $$ 6446, 6447,
6449, 6450, the plaintiff had the burden of showing why such
statutes did not apply.
2.

EJECTMENT—MEASURE

LAND. Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 7648, 7657, relating to claims against
the estate of deceased arising upon contracts, held inapplicable
to a claim for damages for detention of land, such statutes
having no reference to claims for damages arising from tortious acts.

No. 3613. Decided May 9, 1921. Rehearing Denied July 15, 1921.
(199 Pac. 670.)
ADVERSE P O S S E S S I O N — P L A I N T I F F

INSUFFI-

HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES FOR DETENTION OF

Intervener).

1.

HELD

REVIEWED. Appellate court will not review findings on conflicting evidence though i t s own v i e w s a s to the weight of the evidence might not agree with those of t h e trial court.

e t al. ( S T A T E , b y

COMMISSIONERS,

FOR IMPROVEMENTS

ejectment a measure of damages against defendant for detention of property is t h e rental value of the land in the condition
it was in during the period for which damages are claimed.

M A N , J J . , concur.

VAN

EJECTMENT—COUNTERCLAIM

CIENT. In ejectment against defendants, who had been in possession while the land belonged to the state, counterclaim for
value of improvements placed on land by defendants, under
Occupying Claimant Statute (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 5031-5038),
held insufficient, in that it failed t o show that defendants' possession w a s under color of title in good faith, under section
5035, or under state land laws administered by state board of
land commissioners.

u p o n a l l u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n s of fact, y e t it is n o t r e q u i r e d t o
e i t h e r p a r t y t o m a k e specific
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APPLICAHLE

TO LANDS

UNITED STATES TO STATE FOR COMMON SCHOOLS.

GRANTED BY
Title to

land

granted to the state by the Enabling Act (Act Cong. July 16,
1894), for the support of the common schools in the state,
cannot be acquired by adverse possession a s against the state
under Comp. Laws 1917, g§ 6446, 6447, 6449, 6450, in view of
section 10 of the Enabling Act, and in view of Const, art. 10,
§ 3, art. 20, § 1, though the state sold the land under section

On Rehearing.
8.

APPEAL AND ERROR—JUDGMENT ON FINDINGS SUSTAINED BY S U B -

STANTIAL EVIDENCE AFFIRMED.

If there is any substantial evi-

dence to sustain the findings, the judgment should be affirmed.
9.

EVIDENCE—COURT

WILL

NOT T A K E

JUDICIAL

KNOWLEDGE

PRODUCTION OR COST OF HARVESTING, ETC., OF LUCERN.

AS TO

The Su-

preme Court will not take judicial notice that land will not
produce two tons of lucern per acre without irrigation, or that
market value of lucern would not be $15 per ton, or that the
cost of harvesting, bailing, and preparing it for market would
exceed $5 per ton.

» Pioneer Investment
and Trust Co. v. Board
Utah, 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1016.

of Education,

35

420

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[July

Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418
Appeal from District Court, Seventh District, Carbon
County; Geo. Christenscn, Judge.
Action by A. D. Van Wagoner against J. W. Whitmore,
administrator of the estate of George C. Whitmore, deceased
and another in which the State of Utah, by its State Board
of Land Commissioners, intervened. Judgment for plaintiff,
and defendants appeal.
AFFIRMED.

A. R. Barnes and D. N. Straup, both of Salt Lake City,
for appellants.
Ferdinand Erichsen and Thos. L. Mitchell, both of Salt
Lake City, and M. P. Braffet, of Price, for respondent.
Harvey Cluff, Atty. Gen., and JlerhcrV E. Smyth, of Salt
Lake City, for intervener.
THURMAN, J.
This is an action in ejectment to recover possession of a
part of section 2, township 15~sbiithf of rarigeT^east, of theT
Salt Lake base and meridian, situated in Carbon county,
Utah, and damages for detention of the property.
The action was originally commenced against George C.
Whitmore and Peter C. Jones. The answer of these defendants disclosed the fact that Whitmore claimed ownership of
the property by adverse possession, and that Jones was Whitmore's agent merely, and claimed no other interest.
The quantity of land claimed by Whitmore is 56.68 acres.
By their amended answer defendants rely on certain statutes
of limitation as the same are found in the Compiled Laws of
Utah 1907, in force when the action was commenced. These
statutes now appear in Comp. Laws Utah 1917 as sections
6446, 6447, 6449, and 6450.
The state of Utah, by its Board of Land Commissioners

1921]
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(hereinafter called Board), having sold the land in controversy to plaintiff in accordance with proceedings had under
the statutes relating to the disposal of state lands, conceived
the idea that the state was an interested party and should
be permitted to intervene. The intervention was allowed,
and a complaint in intervention filed by the Board.
The pleadings are prolix, but the issues free from complications.
Without attempting to state in detail the various allegations of the pleadings, or even the substance thereof, in this
connection it is sufficient to state that the plaintiff claims
title under a patent from the state issued by the Board. J.
W. Whitmore, as administrator, successor to George C. Whitmore, who died after the action was commenced, claims title
by adverse possession under the statutes above referred to,
while the state, as intervener, in defense of plaintiff's title,
contends that the statutes of limitations relied on by defendants have no application to the case.
The complaint in intervention sets out in minute detail
various grounds upon which the state challenges the validity
of the defense interposed by the defendants. The grounds,
relied on by the Board, and the reply thereto, as far as the
same are material, will appear later on in our discussion of
the questions involved.
After the substitution of J. W. Whitmore, administrator,
as defendant, he was permitted by the trial court to amend
his answer and file a counterclaim for the value of the improvements placed on the land by his intestate in the event
that it should be adjudged that plaintiff is entitled to the
property. The court to whom the case was tried without a
jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff, both for the
possession of the land and damages for its detention, and refused to allow the value of the improvements claimed by the
defendants in the counterclaim.
Judgment was accordingly entered for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Many errors are assigned, and the same
will be considered as far as necessary to the determination
of the questions involved.
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While the question of damages claimed by respondent and
the value of the improvements claimed by appellant Whitmore, in the event that respondent, Van Wagoner, is adjudged to be entitled to the property, are questions that must
be determined, it is conceded by all parties to the action that
the controlling and overshadowing question is, Are the lands
in controversy subject to the statutes of limitations relied on
by appellants and can title thereto be acquired by adverse
possession! If these questions must be answered in the affirmative, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed;
if answered in the negative, then questions relating to respondent's damages and value of improvements claimed by
appellants must be determined.
As the statutes of limitation specifically pleaded and relied
on by appellants constitute the foundation of their defense
to respondent's action, they are deemed of sufficient importance in this connection to quote at length for the convenience
of the reader. The quotations are made from the Compiled
Laws of Utah 1917:

or under whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor, or grantor of such
person was seized or possessed of the property in question within
seven years before the committing of the act in respect to which
such action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made."

"6446. The state will not sue any person for or in respect to
any real property, or the issues or profits thereof, hy reason of the
right or title * * * to the same, unless:
"1. Such right or title shall have accrued within seven years
hefore any action or^other proceedHng for the same shall be commenced; or,
"2. The state or those from whom it claims shall have received
the rents and profits of such real property, or some part thereof,
within seven years.
"6447. No action can be brought for or in respect to real property by any person claiming under letters patent or grants from
this state, unless the same might have been commenced by the
state as herein specified, in case such patent had not been issued or
grant made/'
"6449. No action for the recovery of real property, or for the
possession thereof, shall be maintained, unless it appear that the
plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor, or predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven years, before the
commencement of the action.
"6450. No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an
action, founded upon the title to real property or to rents or profits
out of the same, shall be effectual unless it appears that the person
prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or counterclaim,

It is an undisputed fact that George C. Whitmore was in
the open and notorious oeeupancy and possession of the land
in question ever since long hefore Utah was admitted into
the Union. It is also undisputed that he inclosed the land
with a fence, made other improvements thereon, such as the
construction of water ditches, and that he cultivated the land
and produced crops thereon from year to year. TJiere were
all the outward appearances of an adverse holding by him
under claim of right, except the payment of taxes on the land,
and, as to those, none were levied or assessed/\ Whether or
not it was his duty to pay taxes in any event, whether the
land was assessed or not, in order to establish a title by adverse possession presents a question of law which may or may
not be necessary to determine in the case at bar, and as io
whether or not he intended to hold adversely to the state,
which at the date of its admission into the Union became the
legal owner of the property, does not appear, but for the purposes of the discussion the fact may be admitted. With these
outward af>p^arance5_^iulJndications undisputed, and the
other facts assumed, it would seem that the sections of the
statute relied on afford a complete bar to respondents action
in the present case; that is to say, taking the outward appearances above referred to, and assuming that the payment
of taxes was not required, and that the intention of Whitmore was to hold adversely and not in subordination to the
state, the conditions seem to favor the contention of appellants that respondent's right of action was barred when the
suit was commenced.
However, inasmuch as the class of land to which the land
in controversy belongs was granted to the state of Utah by
act of Congress July 16, 1894, commonly known as the Enabling Act, for the support of common schools in the state,
respondents contend that the statutes of limitation do not
apply. Their position is best stated in the words of their own
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counsel as the same appear in their printed brief filed in the

for the people, to be disposed of as map be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be pranted,
donated, devised or otherwise acquired.'1 (Italics ours.)

case :
"Now, we do not contend that the state of Utah has not consented to a bar against the state in some matters, but we do
contend that the lands involved in this controversy, being school
lands, are not within the class of property as to which the state has
consented to be barred, or consented to any title being acquired
by adverse possession. At first blush, section 6446 et seq. might
seem to justify an assumption that the state is barred as to all
real property, but we contend that the nature and purpose of the
school grant from the United States, the wording and spirit of the
acceptance of the grant in the state Constitution, tbe legislative
provisions to carry out and utilize the grant for the purpose for
which it was granted, the necessary incidents of this trust, and
the beneficent result of a faithful performance of the trust, are
such that to permit a construction of said sections 6446 et seq.,
taking away the substance of the grant, despoiling the school fund,
would be an utter violation of the terms of the trust imposed by tbe
donor and of the Bolemn conditions specified in the acceptance of
the grant."
Counsel for respondents then quote from section 6 of the
Enabling A c t (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, p. 3 0 ) , the following
language:
"That upon the admission of said state into the Union, sections
numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two and thirty-six in every township
* • * are hereby granted to said state tor the support ot common
schools."
I n the same connection they also call attention of the court
to section 10 of the same act, which, as far as material here,
reads:
"That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall constitute
a permanent school fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the support ot said schools."
Furthermore, counsel for respondents call the attention of
the court to the following provisions of the state Constitution
made in pursuance of the Enabling A c t :
"Article XX. Section 1. All lands of the state that have been,
or may hereafter be granted to the state by Congress, and yll lands
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or corporation,
or that may otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted and declared to be the public lands of the state; and shall be held in trust

Article 10, § 3, provides that the proceeds of the sale of
state lands and other lands granted for the support of common schools shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest only to be used. Section 5 of the same article is, substantially, to the same effect, while section 7 provides that " a l l
public school funds shall be guaranteed by the state against
loss or d i v e r s i o n / '
From all of these provisions of the Enabling Act and state
Constitution counsel conclude that the sections of the statutes
relied on by appellants are repugnant to, and in conflict with,
the very spirit of the Enabling Act and state Constitution,
and therefore have no application to a case involving lands
granted by Congress for the support of common schools.
W e have purposely indulged in considerable detail in stati n g respondents' position and the basis for their contention for the reason that, in view of the statutes
1
quoted upon which appellants rely, it seems to the
court that the burden rests upon the respondents to show why
the statutes pleaded by appellants do not apply in the present case.
Ik»spomlen4s^lso^ely^ii^e^
eases, somewhat analogous, reference to which will be made later dn.
N o serious contention is made by appellants that the steps
taken by the Board in disposing of the land in question were
not taken in strict compliance with the provisions of the statute relating to the disposal of the public lands of the state.
The general powern of the Board concerning these lands are
defined in Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 5575, which, in part,
reads as follows:
"The Board of Land Commissioners shall have the direction,
management, and control of all lands heretofore, or which may
hereafter be, granted to this state by the United States government,
or otherwise, and to lands lying below the water's edge on any
lake or stream to the bed of which the state is entitled, for any
and all purposes whatsoever, except lands used or set apart for
public purposes or occupied by public buildings, and shall have
the power to sell or lease the same for the best interests of the
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state and In accordance with the provisions of this chapter and
the Constitution of the state."
A patent to the land in controversy was issued by Ihe state
to the respondent, Van Wagoner, June 28, 1916. It is eontended by appellants, and the contention is not seriously
questioned, that as early as 1887 George C. Whitmore entered into possession of this land, fenced it, cullivated it, and
constructed a water ditch for the purpose of conveying water
thereto, and from that time on was continuously in possession
of and claiming said land as his own; that he maintained the
fence and cultivated and irrigated the land down to the trial
of this case. It was stipulate^ by counsel for the respective
parties to this action that from the date of the admission of Utah into the Union no taxes had ever been
2
assessed or levied against the land. Without such stipulation this court would undoubtedly take judicial* notice of
the fact that such land was not taxed as long as the title remained in the state.
It has been assumed for the purpose of disposing of the
questions involved in the plea of adverse possession that appellant Whitmore\s intestate, George C. Whitmore, did everything that was necessary to be done by him to establish title
by adverse possession if the land in controversy is included
within the class covered by the statutes upon which appellants rely. If we understand respondents' position, they practically concede the facts which we have assumed. Relying
upon the fact that all the elements necessary to constitute
adverse possession have been established for the full period
of time required by the statute, appellants insist that the case
comes within the rules declared in Pioneer Investment &
Trust Co. v. Board of Education, 35 Utah, 1, 99 Pac. 150, 136
Am. St. Rep. 1016. In that case it appears the land in question had at one time been used by the board of education for
school purposes, but had long since been abandoned for such
purposes because more suitable for something else. Consequently it was held for sale whenever a satisfactory price *
could be obtained. It was sold by the board and the title warranted. Afterwards the title was contested by a corporation,
claiming title by adverse possession, who refused to surrender
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the property to the purchaser. The party claiming title
under the board of education was compelled to expend money
to quiet his title and brought an action against the board on
a covenant of warranty to recover the sum so expended. The
question of title by adverse possession formed the principal
issue. The fact that the land had been devoted to school purposes and was owned by the board of education in that capacity was pleaded and relied on. The trial court decided the
issue in favor of the plaintiff, and, on appeal to this court,
the judgment wras affirmed.
There are many points of difference between that case and
the one at bar. It is only necessary to mention two or three:
(1) The property had long been abandoned for school purposes and held for sale for other purposes when a satisfactory
price could be obtained; (2) it does not appear that the land
was, or ever had been, land the title to which was in the state;
(3) it does not appear that the land was, in any sense, within
the provisions of the Enabling Act or of the state Constitution, upon which respondents rely in the instant case, and
hence it is difficult to see how the case in any manner meets
the contention made by respondents. Appellants also cite
and rely on the following cases in support of the proposition
thitM44le4o^^h^4aH^4^^onlroversyjnay he^flcquired by ad-L
verse possession: Schneider v. Hutchinson, 35 Or. 253, 57
Pac. 324, 76 Am. St. Rep. 474; Hamilton v. Fluornoy, 44 Or.
97, 74 Pac. 483; Ambrose v. Huntington, 34 Or. 484, 56 Pac.
513; State v. Schmidt, 180 Ala. 374, 61 South. 293; State v.
Schmidt, 232 U. S. 168, 34 Sup. Ct. 301, 58 L. Ed. 555; Miller v. Stale, 38 Ala. 600; People v. Banning Co., 167 Cal.
643, 140 Pac. 587; Redwood County v. Winona, 40 Minn. 512,
42 N. W. 473; School Directors v. Georges, 50 Mo. 194; Burch
v. Winston, 57 Mo. 62; Whitley County Land Co. v. Powers,
146 Ky. 801, 144 S. W. 2 ; Wright v. Phipps (C. C.) 90 Fed.
556; Id. 98 Fed. 1007, 38 C. C. A. 702; Bullard v. Hollingsworth, 110 N. C. 634, 53 S. K. 441. It would be impossible,
within reasonable limits, to carefully review and distinguish
all of these cases. We shall endeavor, however, to give care-
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ful attention to such as appear to be in any sense analogous
to the present case.
In Schneider, v. Hutchinson, supra, the action was to recover possession of certain land granted by Congress to the
state of Oregon for the /Use of schools. The evidence disclosed the fact that the land had been occupied, possessed,
and adversely held by the defendant and others for a period
of more than 20 years. While the land was so possessed and
occupied the board of commissioners for the sale of school
lands sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff's grantor.
The court held that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations and entered judgment accordingly. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. Much of the reasoning of
the court in its opinion consists of a dissertation upon the fact
that the statute of limitations involved in the case, which
barred the action after a lapse of 10 years, applied to lands
which the state held in its governmental as well as in its proprietary capacity, a doctrine which, in our opinion, is against
the weight of authority. While in that case it appears that
the land was granted by Congress to the state for the use of
schools, it docs not appear that Congress, by the same act, or
at all, declared, as in the grant to the state of Utah, that the
proceeds oT the l a n d granted should be and constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only should be expended for the support of schools. Neither does it appear
that the state expressly accepted the lands in trust for the
people with the solemn declaration that they should be disposed of as provided by law for the purposes for which they
had been granted, or that the state guaranteed the fund arising from the sale thereof against loss or diversion. In short,
no such provisions and restrictions as those existing in the
Utah Enabling Act and Constitution are found in the Enabling Act and Constitution of the state of Oregon, or, if such
provisions do exist, they were not invoked in the Oregon case
now under review.

presented here. They are not commented on by appellants'
counsel or specially relied on.
The next case in the order of discussion is State v. Schmidt,
180 Ala. 374, 61 South. 293. TJie case was an action in ejectment brought by the state of Alabama to recover possession
of certain school lands. The case was heard in the trial court
upon an agreed statement of facts. The question was whether
the sixteenth section of school lands in the state of Alabama
was within the statute permitting title to be acquired by adverse possession under color of title. The trial court entered
judgment for defendant, and the state appealed to the state
Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment. What is
meant in the stipulation by "color of title'' does not appear.
We shall, however, consider the ease as if that term had been
omitted. The grant by Congress of the sixteenth section of
every township for the use of schools was, in substance, the
same as the provision contained in section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, heretofore quoted, except that the grant was made
to the inhabitants of the township instead of to the state.
That distinction, however, is immaterial inasmuch as the
court held that, the inhabitants of the township being without legal entity, the legal title vested in the state for the
benefit of those for whom it was intended. The state accepted
The grant. T ^
are not
stated in the opinion. It is stated, however, that " t h e Constitution of 1819, and its several successors, have pledged the
good faith of the state in the premises." I t also appears in
the opinion that the Constitution provided that> such lands
should be preserved from "waste and damage." As far as
appeal's in the opinion of the court, the grant by Congress
did not provide that the fund arising from the proceeds of
said lands should constitute a permanent school fund the interest of which only should be expended for the support of
schools; nor is it shown that the Constitution of the state
guaranteed the proceeds of the land—the funds arising from
the sale thereof—against loss or diversion. These distinctions, in the judgment of the court, are of vital importance
in arriving at a correct conclusion. In the Alabama case it

Hamilton v. Fluornoy and Ambrose v. Huntington, supra,
also Oregon cases, seem to have no bearing upon the question
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seems that Congress manifested no concern whatever as to the
proceeds of the land or the fund arising from the sale thereof.
That question it left entirely to the state, while in the case
of Utah the Enabling Act followed the land down to its very
proceeds, and declared that they should constitute a permanent fund, the interest of which only should be expended for
the support of schools.
The Alabama court in deciding the case appears to have
been controlled by the principle enunciated in the case of
Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173 (15 L. Ed. 338), in which the
court, speaking of grants made to the state for educational
purposes, at pages 181-182 of the report, says:
"The trusts created by these compacts relate to a subject certainly of universal interest, but of municipal concern, over which
the power of the state is plenary and exclusive. In the present
instance the grant is to the state directly, without limitation of its
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public
faith."
The ease was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States in which court the judgment was affirmed. 232 U. S.
168, 34 Sup. Ct. 301, 58 L. Ed. 555. Being a mere matter of,
"municipal concern," if the Alabama court had held that the
state statute of limitations did not apply the federal Supreme
Ootrrt would, na^loutbt,have^ftirmcd 4he^ judgment ^just t h e
same. This much can be said without the slightest reflection
upon the high character of that distinguished tribunal. While
we have noticed some distinctions between this case and the
Alabama case, it by no means follows that we rely upon these
distinctions alone. W e seriously doubt if this court should
follow the lead of that court on the question presented here,
even if the distinctions did not exist. It does seem to us that
where a state accepts a trust concerning land of the nature
described in the Alabama case, and pledges its faith to an
execution of the trust, such land, under the "sacred obligation imposed on its public faith," by reasonable construction
should be excepted from the operation of ordinary statutes
of limitation. However, it is neither the province nor inclination of this court to criticize or find fault with the courts
of a sister state in construing statutes relating to the munic-

ipal concerns of their own state. The decisions of such
courts, while always persuasive, arc in no sense binding. The
same may be said concerning decisions in such cases rendered
on appeal by the highest court in the land, where such decisions simply follow the lead of those rendered in the court
below, relating to their own "municipal concerns."
The Oregon case and the Alabama case are the only cases
relied oti by appellants that in any sense attempt to meet the
contention made by respondent that the Utah Constitution
and Enabling Act exclude the idea that title to school lands
granted by Congress may be acquired by adverse possession.
W e shall therefore not occup'y time and space in reviewing
the other cases cited by appellants.
Questions almost identical with the question ^presented here
have been determined by the courts of last resort of the states
of Minnesota and Washington adversely to appellants' contention. Mnrtanyh v. C, M. & St. P. Rd. Co., 102 Minn. 52,
112 N. W. 860, 120 Am. St. Rep. 6 0 9 ; O'Brien v. Wilson, 51
Wash. 52, 97 Pac. 1115.
\
It is not necessary to comment on these eases; they speak
for themselves. In the Minnesota ease the syllabus, consisting of less than three printed lines, reflects the opinion of
the court.
--THtte 4e^4an4s^^ranted tojthe^state of Minnesota for the use of
its schools by the United States cannot be acquTi^a^^l^v^rseiros^
session, as against the state."
At pages 54 and 55 of 102 Minn., at page 861 of 112 N .
W. (120 Am. St. Ifrp. 6 0 9 ) , the opinion, with greater perspicuity than we are capable of, states the whole case:
"The statute, making statutes of limitations applicable to the
state, to which reference has been made, must be construed with
reference to the school land grant and the provisions of the state
Constitution accepting the grant and providing for the sale of the
land. Section 18 of an act of Congress entitled 'An act to establish
the territorial government of Minnesota,' passed March 3, 1849 (9
St. 408, c. 121), known as the 'Organic Act of Minnesota,' reserved
sections 16 and 36 of every township for the purpose of being applied to schools of the territory and future state. This was supplemented by section 5 of the act of Congress passed February 26, 1857
(11 St. 167, c. 60), authorizing the people of Minnesota to form a
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state government. This section granted to the state sections 16 and
36 of the public lands In every township within the state for the use
of schools, provided the grant should be accepted by the constitutional convention, and, if it were, then its terms should become obligatory on the United States and the state of Minnesota. The convention, and the people of the state by their approval and ratification of the Constitution, accepted the grant of sections 16 and 36 for
the use of the schools of the state, and safeguarded the trust by
providing that the proceeds of such trust lands should remain a
perpetual school fund, and that no portion of the lands should
ever be sold otherwise than at public sale. Const. (Minn.) art.
2, S 3, and article 8, § 2. Our school land grant, then, was not
made to the state, in its proprietary capacity, but in trust, for
the explicit purpose of having the lands applied to the use
of the schools of the state. This was the substantial consideration for the grant which induced the United States to
make it. The state accepted the trust, and by its Constitution
solemnly covenanted with the United States to apply the granted
lands to the sole use of its schools, according to the purpose of the
grant, and prohibited the sale of any portion of the granted land
except at public sale. Such being the nature of the title of the state
to its school land8, It is unthinkable that the Legislature intended
by section 12, c. 66, O. S. 1866, and later acts amending it, to provide a way whereby the trust as to any of the school lands might
be defeated, and title thereto acquired by adverse possession, contrary to the mandate of the Constitution that title thereto could only
be obtained by a public sale thereof."

possession. We accordingly hold that title "to lands granted to the
state of Minnesota for the use of its schools by the United States
cannot be acquired by adverse possession, as against the state."

The concluding paragraph of the opinion, commencing on
pageW^TMMini^
Rep. 6 0 9 ) , is equally perspicuous, and expresses the mind of
the court in terms that cannot be misunderstood:
"We are, then, of the opinion that, if the statute under consideration must be construed as authorizing the acquisition of title to the
school lands of the state by adverse possession, it violates in this
respect, not only the terms of the grant, but also the Constitution of
the state. We are, however, of the opinion that the statute fairly
may be given a construction which is consistent with the terms of
the school land grant and the provisions of the state Constitution
applicable thereto. If the statute be read in connection with the
general and well-understood rule of law that title to public land
cannot be acquired by adverse possession, the history of our school
land grant, the nature of the title of the state to its school lands,
and the mandates of our Constitution with reference to them, it is
clear upon the face of the statute that the Legislature did not intend
to provide for the acquisition of the title to school lands by adverse

Practically every word of that opinion is as applicable to
the conditions existing here as they were to the case in which
the opinion was rendered. Counsel for appellants make an
ingenious attempt to distinguish that case from this because
the Constitution of Minnesota provides that no portion of
the lands should ever be sold otherwise than at public sale.
How abortive this attempt to distinguish the cases must appear when our attention is called to the fact that the Utah
Constitution provides that the lands "shall be held in trust
for Ihc people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law
for the respective purposes for which they have been or may
be granted."
(Italics ours.) This language is an absolute
limitation upon the power of the state to dispose of the lands,
or permit them to be disposed of, except for the purpose for
which they were granted by Congress. Is it conceivable, in
the face of such a constitutional provision, that the Legislature could have intended its statutes of limitation to apply
to such lands? It is our solemn duty to hold that such could
not have been the legislative intent. W h e n to the constitutional provision last quoted we add the further provision that
the state of Utah guarantees the proceeds of these lands
against loss or diversion, thus nuTTung^tself an tnsurer^and in
honor bound to make good any loss that the schools might sustain by diverting these lands, or permitting them to be diverted, to other purposes, the conclusion becomes irresistible
that the statutes of limitations have no application to the land
in question.
In O'Brien v. Wilson, supra, whioli was also a case in which
an attempt was made to acquire title, by adverse possession,
to school lands granted by Congress to the state, the syllabus
in the Pacific Reporter reads:
"Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4807 (Pierce's Code, § 1519),
making limitations prescribed by the chapter applicable to actions
by the state, etc., the same as to actions between individuals, does
not authorize acquisition of title to school lands by adverse possession, since such construction would make the section repugnant
to Enabling Act (Act Feb. 22, 1889, c. 180, 25 Stat. 679) f 11, and
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Const, art. 16, § 2, requiring all school lands to be disposed of at
public sale, etc., and Const, art. 16, § 1, declaring thiit all public
lands granted to the state shall be held in trust for all the people,"
etc.

Tn the concluding sentence of its opinion, at page 57 of 51
Wash., at page 1117 of 97 Pae., the court says:
"In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States
\Northern Pac. Hy. Co. v. Toicnscnd, 190 U. S. 267, 23 Sup. Ct. 671,
47 L. Ed. 1044], 'this being the nature of the title to the land granted
for the special purposes named, it is evident that to give such efficacy
to a statute of limitation of a state as would operate to confer a
permanent right of possession to any proportion thereof upon an
individual for his private use would be to allow that to be done by
indirection which could not be done directly'; and to permit title
to school lands in this state to be acquired indirectly by adverse
possession would be repugnant to the laws of the United States and
the Constitution of the state."

All of which applies to the instant case with equal force
and effect.
Counsel for appellant's undertake to distinguish the Washington case the same as they did the Minnesota case, and our
answer to the attempt so made must he the same as it was in
the Minnesota case. The provisions of the Enabling Act and
the state Constitution are, of themselves, a sufficient answer,
even if there were no adjudicated cases supporting the views
herein expressed.
It is unnecessary to prolong the discussion. The plea of
the statutes of limitations and the claim of title hy adverse
possession should not prevail.
Having reached the conclusion that appellants' plea of adverse possession should not prevail for the reasons
hereinbefore stated, it is unnecessary to determine the
3
questions of estoppel and res ad judicata raised hy respondent, or whether it was necessary to pay taxes on the
land in order to acquire title by adverse possession.
The remaining questions to he determined relate to appellants' counterclaim for the value of alleged improvements on
the land, and damages awarded plaintiff for detention of the
property. These questions will be disposed of in the order
above stated.
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The counterclaim was filed April 10, 1918, in which, among
other things, it is alleged that George C. Whitmore, appellants ' predecessor in interest, entered into possession of the
land in controversy in 1879 or 1880 in good faith, claiming
and asserting right and title thereto, and ever since and until
his death remained in open, notorious, peaceful, uninterrupted, visible, and exclusive possession thereof, under color
of title, and in good faith believing, claiming, and asserting
that he had a good title thereto, and that he held, possessed,
occupied, and cultivated said land adversely to plaintiff and
his predecessor in interest, and made permanent and lasting
improvements thereon, as follows: Grubbing, clearing, and
plowing the land, $2,000; leveling, cultivating, and seeding
the laud, $500; constructing and maintaining a fence upon
the land, $1,000; constructing and maintaining dams, ditches,
and canals for the purpose of irrigating the land, $1,000. It
is then reiterated that his occupancy of the land and improvements made thereon were under color of title, and in
good faith believing that the premises were his own, and adverse to plaintiff and his predecessor in interest. It is further alleged that the land without the improvements was of
the value of $100,000.
The foregoing constitutes the substance of appellants'
counterclaim, on the face of which we feel justified in assuming that the pleader had in mind the Occupying Claimant
Statute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 5031 to 5038, inclusive),
and sought to bring the claim within the provisions of those
sections.
Both plaintiff and intervenor filed general and special demurrers to the counterclaim, alleging as special grounds,
among other things, that defendant sought to assert a right
as an occupying claimant, under the occupying claimant
statute, without pleading facts sufficient to bring such claim
within the provisions of said law, in that the counterclaim
failed to allege that either he or his predecessor in interest
settled upon or occupied the land claimed for a period of
three years under or by virtue of any law or contract with
the proper officers of the state for the purchase thereof, or
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under any law or by virtue of any purchase from the United
States. It is also alleged in the demurrer that the counterclaim is ambiguous in that it cannot be ascertained therefrom
when the alleged improvements were made, what constituted
the alleged color of title, or the alleged good faith under
which the property was occupied or improved, or the facts
and circumstances upon which appellants' predecessor in interest based his alleged belief that he had a good title to the
land. I t is also alleged that for the same reason the counterclaim is unintelligible and also uncertain.
The demurrer to the counterclaim was sustained. Appellants assign the ruling of the court thereon as error, and call
our attention to the following cases in support of their contention: Gibson v. Fields, 79 Kan. 38, 1)8 Pac. 1112, 20 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 378; 131 Am. St. Rep. 278, 17 Ann. Cas. 405;
Croskery v. Busch, 116 Mich. 288, 74 N. W. 4G4; Devine v.
Charles, 71 Mo. App. 210; Sherman v. Cook Co., 98 Mich. 61,
57 N. W. 2 3 ; Dietzlcr v. Whilhite, 55 Kan. 200, 40 Pac. 272;
Hentig v. Redden, 1 Kan. App. 163, 41 Pac. 1054; Hentig v.
Collins, 1 Kan. App. 173, 41 Pac. 1057. None of the cases
have any bearing upon the objections raised by the demurrer.
The demurrer not only makes the point that appellant Whitmore, in his attempt to claim under the occupying claimant
statute fails to state facts to Tiring"his claim within tTie provisions of the law, but the demurrer specifically challenges
the sufficiency of the allegations of the counterclaim respecting good faith and color of title. These objections raised by
the demurrer are not in any manner discussed by appellants'
counsel in their brief, nor in the cases upon which they rely.
In every one of these cases there is something which is generally recognized by the authorities as constituting color of
title and something as indicating good faith. Jn the instant
case, in view of the fact that the improvements for which
compensation is demanded were made while the title to the
land was in the government of the United States, with no
contract for the purchase thereof, how can it be contended
that appellants' predecessor in interest made the improvements in good faith under color of title believing that he was

the owner of the property and had title thereto? Deffeback
v. Ifawkc,W}
U. S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, 29 L. Ed. 423. This
question was fairly presented by respondent's demurrer and
argued in the brief, and, under the circumstances of the case,
in our opinion was of sufficient importance to call for a responsive answer. But this is not the strongest objection
raised by the demurrer. The land in question was land belonging to the state. The law, as we understand it, provides
two remedies in which an occupant of state land, under color
of title, in good faith, may recover the value of his improvements. One is under the state land laws administered by the
State Board of Land Commissioners; the other under Comp.
Laws Utah 1917, § 5035, which is part of the Occupying
Claimant Law, and reads as follows:
"When any person has settled upon any real estate, and occupied
the same for three years under and by virtue of any law or contract
with the proper officers of the state for the purchase thereof, or
under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from the United
States, and shall have made valuable improvements thereon, and
shall be found not to be the owner thereof, or not to have acquired
a right to purchase the same from the state or the United States,
such person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of
this chapter."
It will not be contended by appellants that the counterclaim states a causir~of action tmdet^arry of the laws above
referred to.
We are clearly of the opinion that the counterclaim
docs not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
4
action, and that the demurrer thereto was properly
sustained.
The trial court awarded plaintiff damages for the detention of the property in the sum of $2,280 for the years 1912
to 1916, inclusive. Appellants insist that the damages are excessive, and that the judgment therefor is not sustained by
the evidence. They contend as matter of law that the correct
measure of damages in this case is the fair rental value of the
land in its native state without the improvements placed thereon by appellant Whitmore*s predecessor in interest. In support of the contention they cite the Kansas cases heretofore re-
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ferred to, and in addition thereto the following: Curry v:
Sandusky Fish Co., 88 Minn. 485, 93 N. W. 896; ^Irmor v.
Frey, 253 Mo. 447, 161 S. W. 829; Little Rock v. Jeurycns,
133 Ark. 126, 202 S. W. 45, and cases cited in notes 53, 19
C. J. at p. 1242. Most of these cases refer to transactions
arising under occupying claimant laws for the value of improvements, and not to damages for the detention of property
in ejectment cases. The cases referred to in notes 53, 19 C.
J., supra, are cited in support of the text, which reads as
follows:
"Although there Is some authority to the contrary, the rule Is
that a bona fide occupant holding possession of land under color of
title is not liable for the increased rental value of the land caused
by improvements put upon it by himself, but that the rents must be
computed upon the basis of the condition of the land when defendant took possession."

It is contended hy respondents that these cases do not apply to lands the title to which is in the government of the
United States, and that the alleged improvements upon the
land in question passed to the state of Utah when it became
a state in 1896. The following cases relied on by respondents
appear to be in point: Collins v. Bartlett, 44 Cal. 371; Blair
v. Worley, 2 111. (1 Scam.) 178; Atiridge v. Billings, 57 111.
489^ 4 * ^ f c t ^ - * ^ S ^ ^ S e y m o u r v, Watrnn^
5 Blackf. (Ind.) 555, 36 Am. Dec. 556; Burlerson v. Teeple,
2 G. Greene (Iowa) 542. In further support of their contention that the doctrine relied on by appellants does not apply in the instant case, respondents quote the following excerpt from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Defieback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95,
29 L. Ed. 423, heretofore cited in another connection.
"There can be no color of title in an occupant who does not
hold under any Instrument, proceeding, or law purporting to transfer to him the title or to give to him the right of possession. And
there can be no such thing as good faith in an adverse holding,
where the party knows that he has no title, and that, under the law,
which he is presumed to know, he can acquire none by his occupation. Here the defendant knew that the title was in the United
States, that the lands were mineral, and were claimed as such by
the plaintiff, and that title to them could be acquired only under
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the laws providing for the sale of lands of that character; and
there is no pretense that he ever sought, or contemplated seeking,
the title to them as such lands, or claimed possession of them under
any local customs or rules of miners in the district."

In view of the authorities referred to, and others which we
have examined, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the measure of damages in this case was the rental value of the land
in the condition it was during the period for which
damages are claimed. Under the facts disclosed by
5
the record, appellants were not entitled to a reduction
of the rent on account of the improvements existing on the
land when Van Wagoner became entitled to possession.
The water used on the land during the period for which
damages are claimed was water belonging to George C. Whitmore and was not appurtenant to the land. The question is,
what was the rental value of the land, there being no water
right therefor! In other words, what proportion of the rental
value of the land, including the water, should be apportioned
to the land alone? There is substantial competent evidence
to the effect that the rental value of the land with water was
from $16 to $21 per acre during the irrigation season, while
the rental value of the water alone was $5 per acre. A simple
mathematical computation demonstrates that the rental value
of the land alone was from $11 to $16 per acre during
the irrigatiotTlseasoh. The testimony Avasthe^ame^or^
6
every year from 1912 to 1916 inclusive. The evidence
was conflicting, and we are powerless to review the findings,
even though our own views as to the weight of the evidence
might not agree with those of the trial court.
But in respect to the question of damages as against the
estate of George C. Whitmore, deceased, it is contended by
appellants that the court erred in overruling their motion
for nonsuit made when respondents rested their case. The
motion was interposed on the ground that it appeared in the
evidence that George C. Whitmore died pending the trial of
the case, and that no proof was made that claim for damages
had been presented to the administrator of his estate as provided in Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 7648 and 7657. These
sections read as follows:
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"Sec. 7648. All claims arising upon contracts, whether the same
be due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within the time
limited in the notice, and any claim not presented is barred forever;
provided, that when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the
claimant, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, that the
claimant had no notice as provided in this chapter, by reason of
being out of the state, it may be presented at any time before a
decree of distribution is entered; provided further, that nothing
in this title contained shall be so construed as to prohibit the foreclosure of liens or mortgages as hereinafter provided."
"Sec. 7657. If an action Is pending against the decedent at the
time of his death, the plaintiff must in like manner present his
claim to the executor or administrator for allowance or rejection,
authenticated as required in other cases; and no recovery shall be
had in the action unless proof be made of the presentation required."
The sections quoted are specifically limited to claims
arising upon contracts, and have no reference to claims
7
for damages arising from tortious acts.
In Church's Probate Law and Practice (2d Ed., vol. 2 ) ,
at page 1068, it is said:
"As the statute which relates to the presentation of claims
against estates before actions can be commenced thereon relates to
claims arising upon contracts, other actions do not come within the
rule. Thus no presentation of a claim is necessary before the bringing of an action to recover damages for a wrongful act."
See, also, California cases under the statute from which the
4Jtah^statute was^adopted,—U^r4lm~x^Shi XJlmr^JMx J^aL
460, 47 Pac. 3 6 3 ; Lcverone v. Weakley, 155 Cal. at page 401,
101 Pac. 304.
The motion for nonsuit was properly denied.
W e have carefully considered the various questions presented on this appeal and find no error in the record.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, at appellant's
cost.
C O R F M A N , C. J., and W E B E R , GIDEON, and P R I C K ,
JJ., concur.
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ON Rehearing.
T H U R M A N , J. On application for rehearing appellants
contend that the court erred on the question of title by adverse possession and also as to the question of damages
awnrded to plaintiff.
On the first question appellants' brief is exceedingly elaborate, and if pertinent to the issues involved would be both
interesting and instructive. However the argument from beginning to end is based upon a misconception of the principle
upon which the court decided the case. The court did not
assume that the grant to the state of the lands in question
was made upon a condition subsequent or that such grant
was liable to be defeated by a happening of such condition
or a failure thereof. No such consideration influenced the
judgment of the court, nor is any such thought or idea fairly
deducjblc from the opinion handed down. The court in its
opinion was influenced largely by the doctrine enunciated in
Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. (U. S.) pages 181, 182 (15 L. E d .
3 3 8 ) , cited in our opinion and also relied on by appellants,
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States, in speaking
of the nature of grants of land by Congress to states for
sdiooj^purposcs, s a y s :
"The trusts created by these compacts relaTeT to^ a. Bu^JecT^ertainly of universal interest, but of municipal concern, over which
the power of the state is plenary and exclusive. In the present
instance the grant is to the state directly, without limitation of its
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public
faith." (Italics supplied.)
This court in its opinion recognized the fact that there was
no limitation upon the power of the state, as far as the Enabling Act is concerned, to dispose of the lands in any manner or for any purpose whatever; that the state Hiould even
squander the lauds, or give them away to its favorites without consideration, just the same as it could repudiate its just
obligations and disregard every principle of honor. All this
was fully understood by the court, which was also fully advised that no matter what the state did with the lands, or the
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funds arising- from a disposal thereof, the title would not and
could not revert to the grantor by virtue of any terms of the
Enabling Act. But back of all this, the court was also aware,
as suggested in the excerpt quoted from the opinion in Cooper
v. Roberts, supra, that there was, by the grant to the state,
" a sacred obligation imposed upon its public faith" to devote
the lands in question, or the proceeds arising therefrom, to
the very purpose for which they were granted by Congress.
Influenced by these considerations, together with the solemn
pledges, guarantees, and assurances made by the state Constitution in accepting the grant, this court was compelled to
determine the question once for all as to whether or not the
statutes of limitation relied on by appellants apply to the
lands in dispute. We came to the conclusion the statutes do
not apply for the reason that such application would be repugnant to both the letter and spirit of the state Constitution,
the provisions of which we have quoted at length in the opinion. The Constitution declares that such lands "shall be held
in trust for the people to be disposed of as may be provided
by law for the respective purposes for which they have been
or may be granted.'9
We emphasized the language just
quoted, and stated that it was an "absolute limitation upon
the power of the state to dispose of such lands, or permit
them to be disposed of, except for the purposes for which they
were granted by Congress." We reaffirm what was there
stated, for we find no reason to change our opinion. If there
ever was a solemn declaration of trust made by a grantee of
lands and published as such to all the world, it seems to us
that this declaration is a perfect example. In view of the
pledges, guaranties, assurances, and declarations of the Constitution, it must be conceded that these lands are held by
the state in its governmental capacity and not otherwise.
Where such is the case, ordinary statutes of limitations do not
apply. To bring such lands within the operation of limitation statutes, it is extremely doubtful if anything short of an
amendment to the Constitution could effect the result. It is
not necessary, however, to determine that question in the instant case.

1921]

SUPREME COURT OP UTAH

443

Appeal from Seventh District
With this_ explanation there ought not longer to be any
doubt as to the grounds upon which we based our opinion.
Believing, as we did, that by the Enabling Act the state was
morally bound because of the "sacred obligation imposed
upon its public faith," and believing also that by the provisions of the state Consitution it was not only morally but legally bound to see that these lands or the proceeds thereof
were devoted to school purposes, the court was of opinion the
statutes of limitatioVi had no application to the case.
* On the question of damages the writer of the opinion, at
the time it was written, believed there was substantial evidence to the effect that water for the land could be rented for
the irrigation season for the sum of $5 per acre. So believing, by a simple mathematical demonstration he arrived at
the conclusion that the findings of the court as to plaintiff's
damages were sustained by the evidence. The opinion was
accordingly prepared and rendered. When counsel for appellants filed their petition for a rehearing, and called our
attention specifically to the evidence upon that point, we
found it necessary to make a careful investigation, and we
arc not entirely satisfied that the evidence referred to justified the conclusion reached in our opinion. While there is
evidence to the effect that the rental value of water for irrigatkm^t^kmnyside^was $5^per^acre for the irrigation season^
there is no substantial evidence that such water was available for the land in question, so that the opinion, in that respect, is subject to the criticism of appellants' counsel.
This, however, is an action at law. The purpose of the appeal is to reverse the judgment. If there is any substantial
evidence to sustain the findings the judgment should be affirmed. There is evidence in the record of an entirely
different character from that above referred to, which
8
it becomes our duty to consider. One Geo. N. Hill, a
witness for plaintiff, farmer by occupation, acquainted with
the land in controversy and climatic conditions in that vicinity, testified that during the years 1912 to 1916, inclusive, the
winter snows and rainfall in the neighborhood where the
lands arc situated were sufficient to produce one good crop
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of luccrn without irrigation ; that a good crop of lucern would
amount to approximately two tons per acre, that baled lucern
hay during the years mentioned had a market value at Sunnyside of $15 to $17 per ton, and that the cost of cutting,
raking, stacking, wiring, and baling would not exceed $5 per
ton. Conceding, as contended by appellants' counsel, that
there were only 38 and a fraction acres of the land in controversy that was in actual cultivation, and, taking the lowest
market price per ton mentioned in the evidence referred to,
the amount of damages is easily ascertained. Two tons per
acre for 38 acres is 76 tons per year. This amount, multiplied by $10, the net price per ton after all costs and expenses
are paid, amounts to $760 per j'ear. For five years, from
1912 to 1916, inclusive, the amount would be five times $760,
or $3,800. In addition to this, the same witness testified that
after the hay was cut the land was worth $1 per acre annually for pasture, which for the five years would aggregate
$190, making a total of $3,990.
This court cannot take judicial notice of the fact, or assume as a matter of common knowledge, that the land would
not produce two tons of lucern per acre, without irrigation,
or that its market value when baled would not be $15
per ton, or that the cost of harvesting, baling, and pre9
paring it for market would exceed $5 per ton. If we
cannot take judicial notice of These facts we are bound to
accept the evidence as substantial, even though there may be
those who seriously doubt its credibility.
Having considered all the grounds assigned by appellants'
counsel in support of their application for a rehearing the
court is of the opinion the application should be denied.
CORFMAN, C. J , and WEBER, GIDEON, and FRICK,
J J . , concur.

